Haifa Research Lab, Haifa University Campus, Mount Carmel, Haifa, Israel
We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed setting where the participants annot be assumed to follow the algorithm but rather their own self-interest. As such pxticipants, termed agents, are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the algorithm ...
2nd ACM conference on Electronic commerce, 2000 – EC
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is a general method for the construction of truthful mechanisms called VCG (Vickrey, Clarke, Groves). When applying this method to complex problems such as combinatorial auctions, a difficulty arises: ...
Proceedings 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2001), 2001 – EC
We study the following problem: A seller wishes to sell an item to a group of self-interested agents. Each agent i has a privately known valuation vi for the object. Given a distribution on these valuations, our goal is to construct an auction that ...
Proceedings of the Twenty-Third Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, PODC 2004, 2004 – PODC
We study a generic task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a directed graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. Each edge has an associated cost that is privately known to its owner. Let s and t be two ...
43rd Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS 2002), 2002 – FOCS
We study a fundamental problem in micro economics called optimal auction design: A seller wishes to sell an item to a group of self-interested agents. Each agent i has a privately known valuation vi for the object. Given a distribution on these ...
Ryan Porter, Amir Ronen, Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz
UAI '02, Proceedings of the 18th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence, 2002 – UAI
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which the private ...
Proceedings 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2004), 2004 – EC
We study a generic task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a directed graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. Each edge has an associated cost that is privately known to its owner. Let s and t be two ...
Proceedings 3rd ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2001), 2001 – EC
A major achievement of mechanism design theory is the family of truthful mechanisms often called VCG (named after Vickrey, Clarke and Groves). Although these mechanisms have many appealing properties, their essential intractability prevents them from ...